Summary

During a July 2026 training rotation at fort-irwin’s National Training Center, leaders of the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (“Spartan Brigade”) told reporters that defeating enemy drones remains the unit’s single biggest maneuver-capability gap. The story is a ground-level, unit-level counterpart to the vault’s steady jiatf-401 procurement narrative (Titan-MS, Domestic Shield, Perennial Autonomy) — it documents organic capability shortfalls rather than program awards. None of the sub-units DefenseScoop visited with the 4th Infantry Division at fort-carson (during NGC2 testing) reported having organic counter-UAS equipment. The piece situates the gap within the broader Russia-Ukraine-driven debate over armor relevance, citing a retired Lt. Col. Amos Fox Small Wars Journal essay warning the armor branch could “be dead by 2035,” and introduces the air-ground littoral (AGL) as contested terrain heavy units must own but currently cannot due to unresolved counter-UAS gaps.

Key Claims

  • Lt. Col. Joseph Steadman (commander, 6-8 Cavalry) called the inability to defeat drones “the biggest capability gap” for an Army Brigade Combat Team’s ability to maneuver.
  • Col. Alexis Perez-Cruz (commander, 2nd ABCT) said the Army does not yet have enough counter-UAS technology at the brigade level: “I think we’re just scratching the surface on counter-UAS.”
  • No sub-units visited with the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson (during NGC2 prototype testing) had organic counter-drone equipment, per DefenseScoop’s own reporting.
  • The Army is investing in new platforms partly framed around the drone threat: the AI-minded M1E3 tank and the XM30 (Bradley replacement), alongside doctrine updates advising tank platoons on drone defense.
  • 2nd ABCT trained UAS-assisted logistics resupply and rapid repositioning (via Infantry Squad Vehicles) during the Fort Irwin rotation to mitigate drone vulnerability of sustainment formations.
  • Retired Lt. Col. Amos Fox’s Small Wars Journal essay argues the armor branch faces a self-imposed “death ride” toward obsolescence by 2035, citing insularity and an outdated “maneuver-centric fetish.”
  • In January 2026, soldiers deployed to the southern border asked senior Army officials about the handheld counter-UAS weapon Dronebuster, which Army Secretary dan-driscoll called “fucking terrible.”
  • Both the SWJ essay and 2nd ABCT leadership identify the “air-ground littoral zone” (AGL) — airspace-to-land border congested with drones — as critical, contested terrain for heavy units.

Notable Quotes

“If we can’t do something about the enemy’s UAS and do it rapidly, then we’re not going to be successful at continuing to maneuver.” — Lt. Col. Joseph Steadman

“I don’t think at our level … we have enough of the technology … I think we’re just scratching the surface on counter-UAS.” — Col. Alexis Perez-Cruz

“Until we solve the counter-UAS problem, we’re never going to fully own the AGL.” — Lt. Col. Joseph Steadman